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While theory assigns public education expenditures a key role in growth, empirical support of the link is mixed. 2 As highlighted by William F. Blankenau and Nicole B. Simpson (2004) , the disconnect between theory and data can be reconciled by taking a closer look at the theory. In nearly every model where growth is fueled by public education expenditures, a nonmonotonic relationship between expenditures and growth can arise. Public education spending increases growth while taxes may decrease growth, leaving the net effect ambiguous.
Thus economic theory shows that to identify the growth effects of expenditures, one must account for any offsetting effects of the requisite taxation. However, most empirical investigations of these effects do not explicitly control for the method of finance. 3 In contrast, we make the relationship between expenditures, taxation and growth central to our analysis. We estimate a growth equation which arises from a fully specified theoretical model where public education expenditures matter for growth. A key innovation is that the regression accounts for the general equilibrium adjustment to the taxes levied in support of education.
Using panel data from 23 developed countries over the period 1960-2000, we find a positive relationship between public education expenditures and long-run growth only when 2 controlling for the government budget constraint. 4 An interpretation of these results is that studies which fail to control for the method of finance underestimate the role of public education expenditures. A statistically insignificant coefficient in such analyses may indicate a positive growth effect of expenditures that is offset by the negative consequences of taxation.
I. Model
We develop an overlapping generations growth model which shares some features with Gerhard Glomm and B. Ravikumar (1997) 
As a worker in period t+1, the agent receives net labor income equal to ) 1 ( A period t agent maximizes lifetime utility by choosing consumption in periods t+1 and t+2 (C t,t+1 and C t,t+2 ) and K t+2 . Utility is logarithmic in C t,t+1 and C t,t+2 and utility in period t+2 is discounted at the rate of β . Consumption is taxed at the rate c τ . The agent's budget constraint in
Solving the agent's problem for optimal savings yields (2) ). 
Government spends a share e of output on education expenditures. An additional share of output, g, is spent by the government for purposes other than education. Expenditures are financed through taxes on labor and capital income, through a consumption tax, or through borrowing which is proportional to output ) ( t Y and given by t bY . Government policy then is the
. These are related through the government budget constraint by (3) .
Expenditures are related to educational inputs by
. Along a balanced growth, equation (1) reduces to
where γ is the growth rate. Substituting equation (1) and wages into equation (2) yields an
. Putting this into equation (4), taking the logarithm of each side and using
To complete the model, we make use of equation (3) to find the relationship between e and i τ . Let t C represent total consumption. Then equation (3) 
is the ratio of consumption tax revenue to income tax revenue and is constant with balanced growth. Equation (5) 
is the measure of item j x of country n in period t. We lag education expenditures one period (i.e., five years) since it takes time for public education expenditures to impact growth.
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Replacing the item following 2 β in equation (6) with actual income taxes gives the analog to the specification in Michael F. Bleaney et al. ((1999) ; hereafter BGK). There, a one unit increase in t e would increase predicted growth by 1 β . This requires the implicit assumption that increments to education spending are funded from nondistortionary revenue sources. We instead allow for expenditures to be financed by distortionary taxes but assume that revenue shares across the types of taxes are unaffected by ; t e that is, t φ is independent of t e .
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II. Empirical Analysis
We use data from 1960-2000 for a group of 23 developed countries 7 ; the data are from the World Development Indicators (WDI) database of the World Bank (unless otherwise noted).
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The dependent variable is the five-year average of the annual per capita real GDP growth rate for each country. The independent variables also represent five-year averages and the share variables are expressed as a percentage of GDP.
Our model suggests that taxation can alter the positive growth effects from increased public education expenditures. We therefore run a series of regressions using ordinary least squares (OLS) in which we compare the estimated growth effects of public education expenditures with and without τ i . 8 We control for other variables that potentially affect the relationship between growth and public education expenditures. The initial level of economic development (y 0 ) is often considered to impact how fast countries grow (Robert J. Barro and
Xavier Sala-i-Martin (1999)); we use 1960 per capita GDP as a proxy for y 0 . There is evidence supporting the inclusion of government spending net of education (g) and the federal government budget surplus (b) in the growth regression as additional regressors (William Easterly and Sergio Rebelo (1993) and BGK (1999) ). Also, a large literature suggests educational outcomes are important determinants of growth. 9 We control for gross enrollment ratios for primary schooling (S), as reported in the World Bank's EdStats. We also include country-and time-specific fixed effects (where appropriate).
First, we consider the basic relationship between public education expenditures and growth when not controlling for taxation, by estimating equation (6) but setting β k = 0 for k > 1 (Regression 1). This specification does not consider the growth effects of other fiscal factors, nor does it address how public education spending is funded. We then re-estimate equation 1 but set β k = 0 for k > 2, thus allowing for the revenue side of fiscal policy to impact growth rates (Regression 2). Table 1 Lastly, we run the BGK regression where we include actual income taxes in the regression such that increments to public education expenditures are implicitly financed by nondistortionary taxation. Neither public education expenditures nor income taxation have significant growth effects. This lack of significance on the expenditure coefficient might be taken as evidence that expenditures do not matter for growth. However, since the regression does not control for the offsetting effect of the distortionary tax, this conclusion is misleading. Rather than finding that expenditures are unimportant for growth, it demonstrates that the negative tax effect is offsetting the positive education expenditures effect.
Some of our control variables are significantly correlated with growth. The coefficients on initial per capita real GDP (y 0 ) are negative and significant, indicating that richer countries grow at slower rates than poor countries. In addition, the lending position of a country (b) has significant positive growth effects. However, government spending net of education (g) and gross enrollment ratios for primary schooling (S) are not significant predictors of growth.
A key implication of our findings is that including both sides of the government budget sheet is essential when estimating long-run growth effects. Public education expenditures improve long-run growth in rich countries, as long as crowding-out effects are taken into consideration, via the imposition of the government budget constraint and the inclusion of initial per capita GDP and other controls.
III. Conclusion
This study considers the links between public education expenditures and long-run growth. After developing a theoretical model that yields a specific growth equation to estimate, we find that a positive relationship exists between public education expenditures and growth for developed countries. However, this relationship is sensitive to the imposition of the government budget constraint. For example, we find no significant growth effects of public education expenditures when crowding-out effects are not properly taken into consideration. Our work suggests that the inability of some studies to find a robust relationship between public education spending and growth may reflect a failure to properly account for the method of finance. Note: The dependent variable is the five-year average of the annual per capita real GDP growth rate. Standard errors are in parentheses. * (**) represents significance at the 10% (5%) level.
Regressions 1-2 include two-way fixed effects, while regressions 3-4 include fixed effects over time; none of which are reported. In the BGK regression, i τ is replaced with actual income taxes. Standard errors and covariance are corrected for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity.
